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Abstract- The new EU Animal Health Strategy suggests a 
shift in emphasis away from control towards prevention 
and surveillance activities for the management of threats 
to animal health. The optimal combination of these 
actions will differ among diseases and depend on largely 
unknown and uncertain costs and benefits. This paper 
reports an empirical investigation of this issue for the 
case of Avian Influenza. The results suggest that the 
optimal combination of actions will be dependent on the 
objective of the decision maker and that conflict exists 
between an optimal strategy which minimises costs to 
the government and one which maximises producer 
profits or minimises negative effects on human health. 
From the perspective of minimising the effects on 
human health, prevention appears preferable to cure 
but the case is less clear for other objectives. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2007, the European Commission published a new 
Animal Health Strategy (AHS) for the European 
Union (2007-2013) with the vision that “prevention is 
better than cure” [1]. The goals of this strategy are to 
ensure a high level of public health and food safety, to 
promote animal health thereby supporting farming and 
the rural economy, to improve economic growth, 
cohesion, and competitiveness, and to promote 
farming practises and animal welfare which prevent 
animal health related threats and minimise 
environmental impacts. Four areas of activity are 
outlined: prioritisation of EU intervention; a modern 
animal health framework; animal-related threat 
prevention, surveillance and preparedness; and 
science, innovation and research. With respect to the 
first area, threats to animal health will be assessed to 
determine their relevance to the goals of the AHS, the 
“acceptable level of risk” for the Community, and the 
relative priority for action to reduce the risk. For 
serious threats to human health and the rural economy, 
the goal is to reduce the risk to a negligible level.  
An increasing number of outbreaks of Avian 
Influenza (AI) in domestic poultry have occurred 
worldwide in the last few decades; with large 
outbreaks also in EU member states, namely in the 
Netherlands and Italy. Similar to other epizootic 
diseases such as Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) and 
Classical Swine Fever (CSF), outbreaks of AI can 
have serious impacts on animal health and welfare, 
producers, markets and trade. In contrast to FMD and 
CSF however, AI viruses also have implications for 
human health. AI viruses can be transmitted to humans 
causing a range of illness from no symptoms, through 
to conjunctivitis, serious influenza and fatalities [2, 3]. 
Additionally, AI viruses can either mutate or reassort 
to become a novel influenza virus in humans, 
potentially resulting in an influenza pandemic [3].  
The risks to human health suggest that demand 
shocks may also be relevant, since consumers may 
perceive a health risk to be present from eating 
infected poultry meat.  In 2006, consumption of 
poultry meat dropped severely in several EU member 
states, following reports of cases of AI in wild birds 
and backyard poultry [4]. However, this effect on 
consumption was not seen in 2007 [5]. It seems likely 
that outbreaks of AI will remain a threat in the 
foreseeable future. Considering the potential impact 
that AI could have on the achievement of the goals of 
the AHS, it would appear to be a high priority threat. 
The AHS envisages a shift in emphasis away from 
control towards prevention and surveillance. In the 
management of epizootic animal diseases, three 
population states are distinguished. The normal state is 
disease-free where there is no disease present in the 
population. Once the disease is introduced, there is 
usually a period of delay before the disease is 
detected. During this state (called the high risk period, 
HRP), the disease can spread freely within the 
population. Once the disease is detected then the 
population enters the post-HRP state and control 
measures are implemented to eradicate the disease. 
Risk management of epizootic diseases aims to 
influence the occurrence and timing of the events of 
disease introduction (prevention), detection 
(monitoring/surveillance) and eradication (control). 
The balance between these three actions will differ 
between diseases and depends on the uncertain (and 
often unknown) costs and benefits of each action.   
The literature regarding the analysis of prevention 
versus mitigation options for threats to animal health 
is limited. In the context of epizootic animal diseases, 
Elbakidze and McCarl [6] examined the optimal 
balance between pre- and post-event actions with a 
specific application for FMD. The decision problem 
was to choose the level of surveillance and control that 
minimised expected costs, where surveillance and 
control had per unit costs and losses related to the 
value of culled herds. Their results suggest that the 
optimal level of investment in surveillance is 
increasing in the rate of disease spread, cost of control 
and probability of disease introduction; and decreasing 
in the effectiveness of control and cost of surveillance. 
In the context of diseases at farm level, Chi et al. [7] 
considered the optimal balance between prevention 
and treatment of disease. Much more attention has 
been given to these options individually, particularly 
regarding control strategies for epizootic animal 
diseases [e.g. 8, 9-11]. Analysis of prevention [12] and 
surveillance [13] options is less frequent and focuses 
on (stochastic) cost-effectiveness. In their welfare 
analysis of the effects of the CSF outbreak in the 
Netherlands in 1997, Mangen and Burrell [11] clearly 
showed that the concept of the economic losses 
associated with a disease outbreak is quite simplified. 
Total losses hides the differential effects on 
stakeholders where some stakeholders may actually 
gain from an outbreak. In the analysis of Mangen and 
Burrell [11], this differential effect was particularly 
noticeable for producers situated inside and outside the 
quarantine zone. The differential effect on 
stakeholders will be particularly complex when 
demand shocks may also play a role, such as in the 
case of AI. 
The aim of this paper is to explore the issue of the 
optimal levels of prevention, monitoring (surveillance) 
and control for the management of AI outbreaks in 
domestic poultry. Particular attention is given to 
identifying situations where prevention may be 
preferred to cure.  The approach is based on a national 
decision maker who is responsible for formulating risk 
management strategies for AI. It is assumed that the 
decision maker chooses the level of prevention, 
monitoring and control to optimise the expected value 
of an objective function across two states of nature; 
the normal (no-outbreak) and outbreak states. The 
outbreak state in this model consists of the HRP and 
post-HRP states defined earlier (i.e. all states where 
the AI virus is present in the population). Different 
objective functions are explored relating to the 
economic impacts on stakeholders, the costs to the 
government and the effects on human health 
(infections with AI). This approach differs from 
standard economic welfare analyses and was chosen 
for two reasons. Firstly, the aim of this paper is an 
exploration of the issue and individual optimisation of 
objectives allows more insights regarding potential 
conflicts to be gained. Secondly, it is not clear how the 
different dimensions of risk (i.e. human health effects 
versus economic impact on producers) should be 
aggregated. The complexity of the objective functions 
makes numerical approaches attractive for exploring 
the optimal levels of prevention, monitoring and 
control. In this paper a stylised facts-based empirical 
application is developed which is based closely on the 
situation in the Netherlands. 
The empirical application in this paper closely 
follows a theoretical framework developed by the 
authors (Longworth et al., submitted). Prevention is 
defined as activities aimed at reducing the likelihood 
of virus introduction (equivalent to the probability of 
the outbreak state occurring). Monitoring is defined as 
activities aimed at early detection of the virus once it 
is present in the poultry population. Control is defined 
as activities aimed at reducing virus spread and 
eliminating the virus from the population. Prevention 
and monitoring are implemented continuously (with 
the focus on implementation during the normal state of 
nature) while control only takes place in the outbreak 
state of nature. In terms of risk reduction, prevention 
reduces the likelihood of the adverse event while 
monitoring and control reduce the consequences 
(“cure”) of the event. In this paper, an intensity 
measure is used for the levels of each action which is a 
conceptual simplification of reality where each action 
consists of a number of discrete measures1. Such a 
simplification is currently necessary but has 
implications for the parameterisation of costs and 
efficacies of each action.  
The outline of this paper is as follows. In section 
two, the empirical model is outlined in terms of the 
                                                 
1
 In theory, all the possible combinations of measures (and 
their individual intensities) could be examined for their 
efficacy. This requires considerable modelling work which 
is currently unavailable for AI (for examples for CSF see 
[12] for prevention, [14] for surveillance and [15, 16] for 
control).  
following components: epidemiological functions, 
effects on human health, the producers’ profit 
maximisation problem, the consumers’ utility 
maximisation problem and objectives of the decision 
maker. In section three the results of the empirical 
model are presented and discussed. Section four 
provides concluding remarks. 
 
II.  THE MODEL 
 
Three choice or management variables are 
considered in the framework: prevention, XP, 
monitoring, XM, and control, XC, with 0≤Xi≤100, for 
i=P, M, C; where 0 represents a very low (almost non-
existent) intensity and 100 represents the maximum 
technically feasible level. Some level of monitoring is 
still present at XM=0, since producers still check their 
flocks everyday and will eventually notice and report a 
disease with very high mortality. This is taken into 
account in the epidemiological functions. Due to the 
complexity of the economic impacts, at this stage 
control excludes vaccination and is restricted to 
culling of infected flocks and preemptive culling of 
risk flocks.  
 
Table 1: Base year dataa used to calibrate the model 
 
a
 Unless otherwise specified, base year refers to the year 2005 
b Anonymous [17] 
c
 Verbeke and Ward [18] 
d
 Huishoudelijke aankopen pluimveevlees Nederland, 2005 4de kwartal.   
Retrieved10-01-2008, 2007, from https://bedrijfsnet.pve.agro.nl/. 
1
 Calculated from feed conversion rates in b 
2
 Calculated from delivery weights and mortality rates in base year. Data 
from b. 
3
 Estimated per person consumption based on total consumption in d. 
 
Variable Value Source 
Length of production cycle in days  53 b 
Price of poultry stock (€/thousand birds), wN 270.5 b 
Price of feed (€/tonne), wF 233 b 
Feed per cycle (tonne), F 279 b1 
Poultry stock per cycle (thousand birds), N 75 b 
Producer price of output (€/tonne), p 750 b 
Output in base year (tonne), qS 155.61 b2  
Number of producer households, s  2800  
Number of consumer households (million), t 10.6  d 
Poultry consumed (kg), qD 13.42 d3 
Consumer price (€/kg) 5.4 d 
Price elasticity of demand for poultry meat -0.47 c  
The epidemiological population under consideration 
is the domestic commercial poultry population within 
a country. 
Prices are currently modelled exogenously. The 
impact of price changes in the normal and outbreak 
states of nature is explored using price scenarios. 
Base year data used to calibrate the model is 
presented in Table 1. This data represents the situation 
in the Netherlands in 2005. The equations in the model 
and the value of parameters are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Functional forms and values of parameters used in the 
model 
Eq. Function and Parameters 
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 A.  Efficacy of prevention, monitoring and control 
 
The key epidemiological processes of virus 
introduction into a population and virus spread are 
captured using three functions. One function captures 
the effect of prevention on the expected annual 
likelihood  of virus introduction into the domestic 
poultry population. The other two functions capture 
the effect of monitoring and control on the expected 
length and size of an epidemic. The specification is 
designed to capture the main effects without detailing 
the underlying biological processes. 
The likelihood of introduction is modelled using a 
similar functional form to that adopted by Leung et al. 
[19] and Finnoff et al. [20] to model the probability of 
invasion for a highly mobile invasive species with 
numerous introduction pathways. The likelihood of 
introduction is specified in equation (1), where a1 
represents some base probability of introduction and 
the parameter a2 represents the efficacy of prevention 
efforts. The function in equation (1) is parameterised 
by assuming that at an average level of prevention 
(XP=50), the expected likelihood of introduction is 
once every five years [21] and that the base probability 
is equal to one outbreak every two years.  
No modelling studies were available which could be 
used to estimate the effects of increases in intensity of 
monitoring and control on the expected final size and 
length of an AI epidemic. Functional forms were 
chosen to represent realistic relationships2. The effect 
of monitoring and control on the final size and length 
of an epidemic is modelled using the function given in 
equations (2) and (3a-3b); where the variable c1 is the 
final size equation3, the variable R0 is the basic 
reproduction ratio4, b1 is the maximum number of 
                                                 
2
 Standard mathematical epidemiological models [22, 23] 
detailing the dynamics of infection in a population and 
transmission between individuals could have been used. 
However the problem of estimating the effect of monitoring 
and control on transmission would remain. Given the 
complexity of all the equations in the model, the approach 
adopted in this paper has been to use this theory to inform 
the choice of a relatively simple functional form for the 
expected size and length of an epidemic.  
3
 The final size equation from a simple mathematical 
epidemiological model assuming a closed population and a 
large number of infected and susceptible individuals [24]. 
The final size is the fraction of the total population which 
would have been infected at the end of an epidemic. 
4
 The basic reproduction ratio is the average number of new 
infections caused by one average infected individual in a 
infected premises at first detection when XM=0, b2 is 
an efficacy parameter for monitoring, c2 is an efficacy 
parameter for control, c3 is the number of expected 
infected premises at first detection, and s is the total 
number of premises (producers) in the population.  
Estimates of R0 for HPAI outbreaks in industrialised 
countries range from 0.9 to 3.6 [25]. In simulation 
studies, a high correlation is often found between the 
length and size of an epidemic [26, 27].  
Equation (4) gives the functional form for the length 
of an epidemic as a function of the size of the 
epidemic (and therefore also monitoring and control), 
where  d1 is the minimum length of the epidemic (the 
minimum expected HRP plus the number of days after 
the last infected farm is detected before the quarantine 
zone is lifted) and d2 is a parameter that relates the 
length of an epidemic to its size. 
The size of the quarantine zone (i.e. the number of 
producers facing production restrictions) is an 
important variable determining the economic impact 
of an animal disease epidemic. Control has a two-
sided effect on the size of the quarantine zone. On the 
one hand, culling of infected and at-risk premises 
reduces the number of infected premises (and 
therefore the quarantine zone) while on the other hand 
the quarantine zone increases because more at-risk 
premises are inside the zone. The functional form 
chosen to capture these effects on the number of 
producers inside the quarantine zone is given in 
equation (5), where f is a parameter reflecting the 
magnitude of the direct effect of control on the 
quarantine zone.  
 
B.  Effects on human health 
 
Although it is known that humans can become 
infected with AI, the relationship between exposure 
and likelihood of infection and illness is unknown. To 
capture some form of exposure, the likelihood of 
infection is modelled as a function of the expected 
epidemic size. Although a major simplification, such 
an approach seems reasonable from the perspective of 
a national decision maker. Given that poultry 
producers will generally have more intense contact 
with poultry, this stakeholder group is assumed to 
have a higher likelihood of infection. Within this 
stakeholder group, producers on infected farms will be 
more at risk than those on uninfected farms. Simple 
linear functions are chosen. No information is 
                                                                                  
population of susceptibles. This measure is an important 
indicator of the rate of spread of an epidemic. 
available to parameterise this effect with any accuracy. 
The health effects for the three stakeholder groups, 
m=n,o,k, (producer n inside the quarantine zone, 
producer o outside the quarantine zone and consumer 
k) are given in equation (6). 
 
C.  Government costs 
 
Government costs are split into an annual and a 
periodic component. Annual costs refer to the costs of 
continuous implementation of prevention and 
monitoring. Periodic costs relate to the costs of control 
and are only relevant in the outbreak state. The 
government cost function for annual costs is 
represented with a cubic function. High levels of 
prevention and control are assumed to be very costly. 
The periodic cost function is represented with a 
quadratic function. The functional forms for the two 
cost functions are given in equations (7a) and (7b). 
Given the lack of data surrounding costs, these 
functions have been parameterised with plausible 
guesstimates based on the costs of current monitoring 
and prevention programmes in the Netherlands and the 
costs of controlling the 2003 HPAI outbreak.  
 
D.  Producer problem 
 
The representative producer is assumed to be profit 
maximising taking the state of nature as given. 
Production technology is represented using a Cobb-
Douglas functional form with constant returns to scale, 
defined over three inputs: poultry stock, N, feed, F, 
and a fixed capital input, K.  This function is given in 
equation (8) where the fixed capital input is used in 
index form with K=1. Output, qS has a per unit price 
of p, poultry stock has a per unit price of wN, feed a 
per unit price of wF and capital a price of wK.  In 
addition producers face per stock unit costs associated 
with the level of prevention and monitoring chosen by 
the national decision maker, ( )MP XXg , . A quadratic 
functional form is chosen for the function, g, as 
represented in equation (9), where it is assumed that 
prevention and monitoring carry the same costs for 
producers (g1= g2). In the outbreak state, poultry flocks 
within the quarantine zone are assumed to be culled 
and thereafter unable to produce until the end of the 
epidemic. 95 per cent of the market price of the culled 
flock is compensated; no compensation is paid for the 
period that production is stopped. Producers outside 
the quarantine zone are assumed to face no restrictions 
on production and may respond to price changes. 
Using the production function in equation (8), the 
corresponding factor demand equations and data from 
2005, the parameters A, α and β were calibrated.  
 
E.  Consumer problem 
 
The utility maximisation problem for the 
representative consumer is based on the classical 
approach of Mussa and Rosen [28]  to model 
consumer demand for differentiated products. This 
approach has been used to model perceived quality 
differences of products, including the case of hormone 
treated beef [see 29].  
The representative consumer is assumed to derive 
utility from consumption of poultry products, qD, and 
of a composite consumption good, z, with a perfectly 
elastic supply. Utility is represented by a quasi-linear 
utility function such that ( ) zqqvu DD +−= θ . 
Consumers perceive that consumption of AI-infected 
poultry products may lead to infection with AI virus. 
These preferences regarding potential risks of AI for 
human health (via consumption of poultry products) 
are represented by the term θ . The preferences 
represented by θ  are potentially different in the 
outbreak and no-outbreak states of nature. A quadratic 
form was chosen for the utility function, v. The utility 
function is given in equation (10) and the 
corresponding demand function in equation (11).  
In the no-outbreak situation, theta is given by 
αθ = , and in the outbreak situation by ( )epsλαθ +=  
(equation 12). The parameters f1 and f2 are calibrated 
using base year data on average consumption and 
price of poultry products in 2005 and an own-price 
elasticity of -0.47 [18]. λ was chosen such that when 
the expected epidemic size is at its maximum, demand 
from the representative consumer is zero.  
 
F.  Objectives of the decision maker 
 
Four separate objectives are considered for the 
decision maker. It is assumed that the decision maker 
wishes to maximise the expected profits and utility of 
the representative producer and consumer, to minimise 
the expected costs for the government and to minimise 
the expected number of annual human infections with 
AI virus. Hereafter, these objectives are referred to as 
the profit, utility, cost and health objectives 
respectively. Prices in the no-outbreak and outbreak 
states of nature are denoted as p0 and p1 respectively.  
The health objective is presented in equation (13).  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ }epshtepshepsshepsXin monP XXX
CMP
,111
,,
min
⋅+⋅−+⋅⋅
  (13) 
This objective can be interpreted as the number of 
stakeholders in each group multiplied by their 
individual likelihood of infection, multiplied by the 
probability of the outbreak state.  
The cost objective is presented in equation (14), 
which is the annual costs plus the periodic costs 
multiplied by the probability of the outbreak state. 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }qzeplcvXinXXcf PMP
XXX CMP
,,
min
,,
⋅+
     (14) 
The profit objective is presented in equation (15). 
This is the expected profit in the outbreak and no-
outbreak states of nature. In the outbreak states of 
nature, two additional sub-states are distinguished 
relating to whether the producer is inside or outside 
the quarantine zone. The likelihood of being inside the 
quarantine zone is equal to the proportion of producers 
expected to be within the quarantine zone, 
s
qz
.  
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where j0pi refer to profits in the normal state of 
nature,  k1pi  refers to profits in the outbreak state of 
nature for producers inside the quarantine zone and 
l1pi  refers to profits in the outbreak state for producers 
outside the quarantine zone. 
Finally, the utility objective is presented in equation 
(16). 
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ){ }zpuXinzpuXin PP
XXX CMP
,,,,1
max
11*00*
,,
θθ +−
     (16) 
 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Optimising each objective separately indicates the 
level of conflict that exists between the objectives. The 
degree of conflict can be shown in a payoff matrix as 
presented in Table 3. This payoff matrix is for the 
scenario where prices do not change. The objective 
which is optimised is shown in the first column. In the 
rows, the corresponding levels of the other objectives 
and the optimal levels of each action (XP, XM, XC) are 
presented. The numbers in bold represent the best 
achievable values for each objective while those in 
italics are the worst achievable values. Table 2 shows 
that there is no conflict (for this price scenario) 
between the health and utility objectives while there is 
quite some conflict between the health and cost 
objectives in terms of minimising health effects and 
between the profit and cost objectives in terms of 
minimising costs. 
 The health objective is minimised when XP and XM 
are at their maximum levels (100) and XC=34. These 
levels correspond to the levels which minimise the 
expected size of the epidemic, hereafter termed 
epidemiologically optimal levels. At these levels, 
utility is also maximised. For these two objectives, 
these results suggest that prevention (as referred to in 
the AHS to include monitoring) is preferable to cure. 
In contrast,  the profit objective stands out because this 
represents a situation of no prevention and maximum 
control. This is due to the assumption that producers 
face annual costs associated with the level of 
prevention and control, but not directly for control. A 
different cost sharing arrangement could reduce the 
conflict between objectives. 
Table 3: Payoff matrix for the four objectives when prices do 
not change 
 
a
 Annual expected number of human infections with AI virus 
b
 Annual expected cost for the government, in million € 
c
 Annual expected profit for a representative producer, in thousand  € 
d
 Annual expected utility for a representative consumer, in utils 
 
Obj. Healtha Costb Profitc Utilityd XP XM XC 
Health 0.05 14.00 133.71 150.24 100 100 34 
Cost 1.53 10.32 153.92 149.34 75 85 25 
Profit 1.61 603.25 206.16 149.35 0 42 100 
Utility 0.05 14.00 133.71 150.24 100 100 34 
 
The payoff matrix in Table 3 reflects the price 
scenario when prices are unaffected by the outbreak 
state. The magnitude and direction of price changes in 
an outbreak depend on the size of supply and demand 
shocks and the nature of any potential trade bans. In 
the EU, both price decreases and increases have 
occurred in response to AI outbreaks. The large 
outbreak in the Netherlands in 2003 resulted in a large 
increase in egg prices (mainly layers were affected); 
while sporadic, small outbreaks in EU member states 
in 2006 resulted in short term decreases in poultry 
meat prices. The first case was consistent with a large 
supply shock (with little or no demand shock) while 
the latter was consistent with demand shocks. Price 
changes have no effect on the optimal levels of actions 
for the cost and health objectives. For the utility 
objective, the optimal levels of XM and XC remain the 
same for all price scenarios while XP = 0 for all price 
decrease scenarios and XP = 100 for all price increase 
scenarios. The effect of price changes on the optimal 
levels of each action for the profit objective are shown 
in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Optimal levels of XP, XM and XC for the profit 
objective under different price scenarios 
 
 Price scenario for the outbreak state, percentage change from 
p0  
 -50 -25 -10 0 +10 +25 +50 
XP 67 50 30 0 0 0 0 
XM 3 37 40 42 43 43 43 
XC 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
  
The level of XC which maximises the profit 
objective is the same regardless of the price scenario. 
XP and XM remain similar for all price increase 
scenarios but differ dramatically for price decreases. 
The larger the expected price decrease the higher the 
optimal level of  XP and the lower the level of XM. 
When prices decrease, producers collectively lose in 
the outbreak situation so a high level of prevention is 
optimal. However prevention and monitoring are 
costly for producers and it is optimal to reduce the 
level of monitoring (the expected epidemic length 
becomes longer but has a smaller impact on expected 
profits because the likelihood of the outbreak state 
occurring is lower). 
These results suggest that the effect of epidemic 
length on profits is more important than the size of the 
quarantine zone (at XC=100 all producers are inside 
the quarantine zone), but this is dependent on the 
assumption that producers face direct annual costs for 
prevention and monitoring but not for control. If the 
epidemic is short (especially if it is shorter than the 
average production cycle), then economic losses for 
producers in the quarantine zone remain small and the 
size of the quarantine zone is less important. The 
impact of different cost sharing arrangements requires 
further investigation, since the results here are 
dependent on the assumptions regarding cost sharing. 
A cost sharing arrangement where the costs of 
prevention and monitoring are spread over all 
stakeholders and where producers also share in control 
costs could reduce the conflict between objectives and 
provide a strategy which is acceptable for all 
objectives and stakeholders.  
If the economic impact on stakeholders is 
considered, then the case for prevention preferable to 
cure is less clear cut. In our analysis, an outbreak does 
not always lead to welfare losses for producers and 
consumers. A similar result was found by Mangen et 
al. [11] for CSF. These welfare effects are heavily 
dependent on price changes. In the current analysis 
prices are exogenous and the effect of price changes 
has been explored through potential price scenarios.  
Endogenising price and trade effects would allow a 
more thorough analysis of this aspect and should be 
addressed in further research.  
Given the difference in approaches it is difficult to 
compare our results with those of Elbakidze and 
McCarl [6] for FMD. Considering the objective of cost 
minimisation (this is closest to their objective 
function), first sensitivity analysis (results not shown) 
suggests similar findings: optimal levels of prevention 
and monitoring increase as the base likelihood of 
introduction increases, the efficacy of control 
decreases, and the costs of prevention and control fall. 
However the effects are different for prevention and 
monitoring. Although prevention and monitoring are 
both pre-event actions, prevention reduces the 
likelihood of the adverse event while monitoring 
reduces the consequences (cure). This is not captured 
by the approach of Elbakidze and McCarl [6].  
 
IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
From the perspective of minimising effects on 
human health or minimising government costs, our 
results indeed suggest that prevention is preferable to 
cure, although these two objectives imply a different 
balance between prevention and monitoring. The case 
is less clear cut when considering the economic 
impacts on stakeholders, which are largely dependent 
on price effects. Endogenising prices in the model 
would better capture these effects. The four objectives 
considered in this paper show different degrees of 
conflict. Different cost sharing arrangement may 
provide an opportunity to reduce the conflict between 
the objectives pertaining to the economic impact on 
stakeholders and those pertaining to human health and 
government costs. However, any overall risk 
management strategy will entail a compromise in 
achieving these objectives. Further research should 
address issues regarding integration/aggregation of the 
objectives.  
These results are indicative only and dependent on 
the functional forms and parameters chosen. A more 
thorough analysis of the sensitivity of results to the 
functional forms and parameters chosen is required. 
As integrated epidemiological and economic studies 
regarding the efficacies and costs of prevention, 
monitoring and control actions become available, this 
empirical application can be further improved.  
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